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2175 
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS: THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT’S UNACHIEVABLE MANDATE FOR 
STATE CANNABIS REGULATION 
Rebecca Sweeney* 
Abstract: The states that have legalized cannabis maintain a complicated relationship 
with the federal government. Since the Ogden Memorandum was issued in 2009, the federal 
government has left regulation of cannabis to the discretion of the states. That policy has 
recently shifted. In 2018, former U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a new 
memorandum that rescinded guidance for states about how to structure the legalization of 
cannabis. The federal government’s current position is now ideologically aligned with that of 
states like Nebraska and Oklahoma. These states chose not to legalize cannabis and instead 
adhere to the Controlled Substances Act’s classification of cannabis as a Schedule I 
substance. In 2015, Nebraska and Oklahoma unsuccessfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court for permission to sue Colorado because its cannabis was leaking outside the state’s 
borders. Nebraska and Oklahoma insisted that Colorado’s legalization scheme compromises 
the drug policies of Nebraska, Oklahoma, and other neighboring states. Because the U.S. 
Department of Justice rescinded its previous guidance and Congress continues to stay silent 
regarding the tension between state laws, the judicial branch has a new opportunity to 
validate the concerns of Nebraska and Oklahoma. Therefore, it is even more important for 
states that legalize cannabis to prevent cannabis from leaking outside their borders. To 
prevent diversion of cannabis outside its state’s borders, the Washington State Legislature 
has created a regulatory licensing system. But despite Washington’s tightly regulated system, 
the federal government remains concerned about the legalized cannabis industry. 
Neither Washington nor Colorado has successfully prevented all cannabis diversion. The 
Cole Memorandum articulated an unrealistic standard for states’ reduction in diversion: total 
elimination. At the very least, Washington and Colorado’s regulatory procedures should be 
compared to those of other states without legalization. Ultimately, the federal government 
should conclusively determine whether states are able to legalize cannabis without the 
overhanging threat of federal intervention on the basis of diversion. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 6, 2012, Washington voters decided to legalize 
recreational marijuana, also known as cannabis.1 Voters approved 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. Special thanks to 
Professor Lauren Sancken for her enthusiasm, critiques, and guidance on this Comment and on law 
school in general. I would also like to thank the Washington Law Review team for their dedicated 
editorial work. 
1. See Jonathan Martin, Voters Approve I-502 Legalizing Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 6, 
2012, 11:40 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/voters-approve-i-502-legalizing-
marijuana/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018). 
18 - Sweeney (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:52 PM 
2176 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2175 
 
legalized recreational cannabis through Initiative 502,2 which 
contradicted the past “75 years of national marijuana prohibition.”3 Even 
though the required majority of voters passed the Initiative,4 the state 
was far from consensus: nineteen of the thirty-nine counties voted 
against legalization.5 
Washington became the second state to legalize cannabis, shortly 
following Colorado’s legalization.6 Colorado’s voters were similarly 
divided when they voted to legalize cannabis through Colorado 
Constitutional Amendment 64.7 Forty-five percent of voters opposed 
legalization.8 Almost two years later in November 2014, Oregon voters 
legalized cannabis as well,9 marking the Pacific Northwest as the “nexus 
of a new social experiment” nationally and internationally.10 Everyone, 
including both proponents and opponents of cannabis legalization, 
waited to hear the federal government’s response.11 
                                                     
2. Voters approved Initiative 502 by 55.7% and counties approved the Initiative by twenty to 
thirty-nine. See November 06, 2012 General Election Results, WASH. SECRETARY ST. (Nov. 27, 
2012, 4:55 PM), http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Measures-All.html 
[https://perma.cc/TL5M-4C56]; Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns Marijuana – County Results, 
WASH. SECRETARY ST. (Nov. 27, 2012, 4:55 PM), 
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502-Concerns-
marijuana_ByCounty.html [https://perma.cc/TL5M-4C56]. 
3. See Martin, supra note 1 (quoting Alison Holcomb, Initiative 502’s campaign manager and 
primary drafter).  
4. See id.  
5. See Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns Marijuana – County Results, supra note 2; Peter 
Clark, Recreational Marijuana Sales by County vs. I 502 Voters, CANNA VENTURES (Dec. 27, 
2014), https://canna-ventures.com/blog/county-marijuana-sales-vs-i-502-voters/ 
[https://perma.cc/BV9G-GXCM].  
6. See Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: Colorado Legalizes Marijuana for Recreational Use, 
HUFFPOST (Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/amendment-64-passes-in-
co_n_2079899.html [https://perma.cc/GV8J-X4WX]. 
7. COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (2012). Fifty-five percent of Colorado voters approved 
Amendment 64, and thirty-five out of sixty-four counties approved. See 2012 General Election 
Results: Amendments and Propositions, COLO. SECRETARY ST., 
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Results/Abstract/2012/general/amendProp.html#64 
[https://perma.cc/4WHQ-D5JU].  
8. Id. 
9. Noelle Crombie, Recreational Marijuana Passes in Oregon: Oregon Election Results 2014, 
OREGONIAN (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/11/recreational_marijuana_passes.html 
[https://perma.cc/JCJ4-GEXM]. 
10. Martin, supra note 1.  
11. Id. (“Many legal experts expect the U.S. Justice Department, which remained silent during the 
presidential-year politics, to push back and perhaps sue to block I–502 based on federal 
supremacy.”); see also A Liberal Drift, ECONOMIST (Nov. 10, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21565972-local-votes-suggest-more-tolerant-
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After Washington and Colorado legalized recreational cannabis, the 
federal government did not take action.12 The U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) only re-stated the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and reported 
that the department was “reviewing ballot initiatives.”13 
The DOJ previously considered whether to actively enforce federal 
law when states first legalized medical cannabis. In 2009, U.S. Deputy 
Attorney General David W. Ogden issued the Ogden Memorandum.14 
The Ogden Memorandum merely advised U.S. Attorneys how to interact 
with states that had only legalized medical cannabis.15 The Ogden 
Memorandum identified seven key characteristics for when the use of 
medical cannabis would implicate federal interests and warrant federal 
prosecution.16 The federal government did not provide an official 
response to states that legalized recreational cannabis until August 13, 
2012. The response was the Cole Memorandum.17 The Cole 
Memorandum articulated similar criteria as the Ogden Memorandum but 
with respect to recreational cannabis.18 The Cole Memorandum indicated 
                                                     
countrybut-not-more-left-wing-one-liberal-drift [https://perma.cc/3LM2-PM2D] (“Marijuana 
remains illegal under federal law, and the divergence in state and federal thinking may yet spell 
trouble . . . .”).  
12. Alex Dobuzinskis & Alina Selyukh, Pot Legalization Proceeds in Key States with Feds 
Mostly Silent, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2012, 12:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
marijuana-legalization/pot-legalization-proceeds-in-key-states-with-feds-mostly-silent-
idUSBRE8AE1NA20121115 [https://perma.cc/QR3Y-ZHLT] (“The Obama administration’s 
relative silence on moves to legalize recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington has left 
officials in those Western states unsure how to move forward without running afoul of the U.S. 
federal government.”). 
13. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
14. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for Selected 
U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum], 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6ZQ-QWR6]. 
15. Id. at 1.  
16. Seven key characteristics were identified by the Ogden Memorandum:  
[U]nlawful possession or unlawful use of firearms, violence, sales to minors, financial and 
marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, including 
evidence of money laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts of cash 
inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law, amounts of marijuana 
inconsistent with purported compliance with state or local law, illegal possession or sale of 
other controlled substances, or ties to other criminal enterprises. 
Id. at 2. 
17. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for All U.S. 
Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa 
/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QX4-LYS3]. 
18. See Vince Sliwoski, Oregon Marijuana, the Feds and the Williams Memo, CANNA L. BLOG 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.cannalawblog.com/oregon-marijuana-the-feds-and-the-williams-
memo/ [https://perma.cc/ZYG5-YCMQ].  
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that the federal government would not challenge state laws legalizing the 
recreational cannabis industry,19 and would permit states to follow 
individual state legalization plans.20 However, cannabis remains 
classified by Congress as an illegal Schedule I substance.21 The 
Controlled Substances Act first listed cannabis as an illegal substance 
since 1970,22 because at that time, the DOJ felt it had “no recognized 
medical use.”23 
The state laws that legalized cannabis and its recreational use 
contradict federal law. This conflict continues to cause concern whether 
the federal government will enforce the Controlled Substances Act 
against Washington, Colorado, Oregon, and other states that have 
subsequently legalized recreational cannabis.24 To address these 
concerns, Washington’s I-502 directed the Washington Liquor and 
Cannabis Board (LCB) to develop rules and procedures in accordance 
with the federal laws.25 The LCB created a highly regulated licensing 
structure that closely limited the availability and production of 
cannabis,26 knowing that the federal government would consider 
diversion of recreational cannabis when determining whether to enforce 
the Controlled Substances Act.27 Like Washington, Colorado tried to 
                                                     
19. Brady Dennis, Obama Administration Will Not Block State Marijuana Laws if Distribution Is 
Regulated, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/obama-administration-will-not-preempt-state-marijuana-laws—for-
now/2013/08/29/b725bfd8-10bd-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html?utm_term=.93b0b78b1a0f 
[https://perma.cc/25T8-U35B].  
20. See id. 
21. See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2012). The Controlled Substances 
Act uses the term “marihuana” instead of “cannabis” or “marijuana.” 
22. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 202, 84 Stat. 1247, 1249 (1970).  
23. Federal Drug Abuse and Drug Dependence Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 
1970: Hearings on S.B. 3562 Before the Special Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the S. 
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong. 473 (1970) (statement of John E. Ingersoll, 
Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of Justice).  
24. See Ferner, supra note 6. The article quotes Colorado Governor John Hickenlooper, who 
stated, “[t]his will be a complicated process, but we intend to follow through. That said, federal law 
still says marijuana is an illegal drug so don’t break out the Cheetos or gold fish too quickly.” Id. 
25. See Wash. Initiative Measure No. 502, § 10(9) (enacted 2012) (codified in WASH. REV. 
CODE. §§ 69.50.301–69.50.369 (2018)), https://www.sos.wa.gov//_assets/elections/initiatives/ 
i502.pdf [https://perma.cc/A34B-RHH3]. 
26. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.301–69.50.395; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55 (2018).  
27. See Gene Johnson, Wash. Vows to Try to Keep Weed in State – But How?, MED. XPRESS (Jan. 
29, 2013), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2013-01-vows-weed-statebut.html 
[https://perma.cc/GSV9-P4D5] (“Part of the DOJ’s political calculus in deciding whether to sue is 
likely to be how well the department believes the two states can keep the legal weed within their 
borders. During a meeting with Inslee last week, Holder asked a lot of questions about diversion, 
Inslee said.”). 
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protect its recreational legalization scheme.28 But instead of limiting 
licenses, Colorado granted licenses to applicants who satisfied 
jurisdictional criteria.29 Colorado hoped to prevent the diversion of legal 
cannabis by controlling every avenue of access to legal cannabis through 
legalization and regulation.30 Colorado permitted vertical integration 
(control of the production, processing, and sale of a cannabis plant)31; 
personal cultivation (home growing and use)32; medical retail sales33; 
and recreational retail sales.34 In other words, Colorado legalized many 
more avenues to access cannabis than Washington. In contrast, 
Washington “ultimately aim[ed] to achieve tighter control of legal 
marijuana [by] prohibiting home grows and manipulating supply to 
ensure desirable prices.”35 
This Comment considers whether the strict limited licensing structure 
used by Washington effectively prevents diversion of legalized cannabis. 
To assess effectiveness, this Comment compares the regulatory 
structures of Washington and Colorado. Part I examines the federal 
government’s requirements for states that legalize cannabis and 
endeavors to explicate standards regarding enforcement and diversion. 
Part II addresses the consequences of failing to regulate cannabis 
properly or failing to prevent cannabis diversion. This Part examines 
Nebraska v. Colorado36 and the ramifications of inter-state hostility. 
Particularly, inter-state hostility in the context of the Trump 
Administration’s policy on cannabis. Part III describes the measures that 
Washington took to prevent diversion, and Part IV explains and 
compares Colorado and Washington’s regulatory structure. Finally, 
Part V compares the effectiveness of each system with the overall goal 
of preventing diversion. This Comment argues that the standards 
                                                     
28. John Walsh, Q&A: Legal Marijuana in Colorado and Washington, BROOKINGS (May 21, 
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/qa-legal-marijuana-in-colorado-and-washington/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-2H2K].  
29. See COLO. CONST. art. 18, § 16(5)(g)(III).  
30. See Walsh, supra note 28. 
31. See id. (“In Colorado, the new legal structure is more consistent with its existing, vertically 
integrated medical market.”).  
32. See id.; Home Grow Laws, COLO.: MARIJUANA (2018), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/marijuana/home-grow-laws [https://perma.cc/S3QQ-T5R8]. 
33. See Walsh, supra note 28.  
34. See id.  
35. John Hudak & Philip A. Wallach, Legal Marijuana: Comparing Washington and Colorado, 
BROOKINGS (July 8, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2014/07/08/legal-marijuana-
comparing-washington-and-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/JF7H-N8MQ].  
36. 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (denying motion for leave to file a bill of complaint).  
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espoused by the Cole Memorandum unrealistically require states to 
eliminate all diversion. This expectation places any state that chooses to 
legalize cannabis in a precarious, uncertain position. The absence of 
clear answers forces business owners, individual consumers, and tax 
beneficiaries to balk at this new opportunity. This Comment concludes 
that an isolated examination of diversion in Colorado and Washington 
presents meaningless data. Instead, comparing diversion rates between 
states that have legalized cannabis and those where cannabis remains 
illegal provides a more realistic understanding of the effectiveness of 
state regulations. The federal government must recognize that the 
regulatory schemes of Colorado and Washington cannot completely 
prevent all diversion, because undoubtedly no system will be able to 
accomplish that task. 
I. STATE CANNABIS LEGALIZATION CONTRADICTS 
FEDERAL LAW, WHICH CONTINUES TO CLASSIFY 
CANNABIS AS AN ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE 
The federal government’s response to the legalization of medical 
cannabis gave states the courage to continue pursuing legalization of 
recreational cannabis.37 However, the federal government has responded 
only through rescindable DOJ memoranda.38 The Ogden and Cole 
Memoranda provided a veneer of security to fledgling cannabis-based 
businesses who took the chance that the federal government would allow 
them to flourish.39 However, those memoranda are not binding on the 
federal government.40 For example, the memoranda do not prevent the 
federal government from changing its current policy or enforcing the 
Controlled Substances Act.41 The Cole Memorandum stated, “[t]his 
memorandum does not alter in any way the Department’s authority to 
                                                     
37. See John Ingold, Federal Government Won’t Block Colorado Marijuana Legalization, 
DENVER POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 5:33 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2013/08/29/federal-
government-wont-block-colorado-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/5PAD-2SMR] (citing 
Gov. John Hickenlooper’s statement earlier that day); Press Release, Wash. State Liquor Control 
Bd., Liquor Control Board Statement Following Department of Justice’s Guidance Memo on 
Marijuana (Aug. 29, 2013), https://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/liquor-control-board-statement-
following-department-justice%E2%80%99s-guidance-memo-marijuana [https://perma.cc/56AB-
LKHK].  
38. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 17; Ogden Memorandum, supra note 14. 
39. See Ingold, supra note 37.  
40. See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (“This memorandum is intended solely as a 
guide . . . .”); Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 4.  
41. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 4; Ogden Memorandum, supra note 14.   
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enforce federal law, including federal laws relating to marijuana . . . .”42 
The Trump Administration underscored the federal government’s 
authority when the DOJ issued the Sessions Memorandum.43 U.S. 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued the Sessions Memorandum on 
January 4, 2018 as a replacement for the Ogden and Cole Memoranda.44 
The Sessions Memorandum removed any perceived sense of security 
that states felt about federal involvement in state legalization schemes.45 
This Part discusses the three memoranda issued by the federal 
government in the last fifteen years relating to cannabis and federal 
enforcement. First, it explains how the Ogden Memorandum set 
precedential guidelines for medical cannabis. Second, it addresses the 
guidelines that the Cole Memorandum established and how they differ 
from standards for medical cannabis. Finally, it addresses the uncertainty 
about the future of cannabis after the rescission of the Ogden and Cole 
Memoranda. 
A. The Ogden Memorandum Responded to Legalization of Medical 
Cannabis and Set a Precedent for the Cole Memorandum 
Several states initially legalized cannabis for medical purposes, not 
recreational use.46 California became the first state to allow medical use 
of cannabis in 1996.47 Under California Proposition 215, also known as 
the Compassionate Use Act of 1996,48 a “qualifying person and her 
caregiver” receive “immunity from criminal prosecution when the state 
attempts to charge such persons with possession or cultivation of 
marijuana.”49 
                                                     
42. Id.  
43. See Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, for All 
U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/J27U-H78H]. 
44. See id. at 1.  
45. See id. 
46. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/UC4F-
BQ36]. Jurisdictions that legalized medical cannabis to some extent before 2009 include: Alaska, 
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Id. 
47. See id.; California’s Medical Marijuana Laws & Regulations, AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, 
https://www.safeaccessnow.org/californias_medical_marijuana_laws [https://perma.cc/JN52-KT22]. 
48. See Cal. Proposition 215, Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (enacted 1996) (codified in CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 11362.5 (West 2018)). 
49. Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of 
Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 707, 708 (1998) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 11362.5(d) (West Supp. 1998)).  
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The federal government issued its response to California and other 
states that legalized medical cannabis in the Ogden Memorandum in 
2009.50 The Ogden Memorandum stated, “[P]ursuit of [the federal 
government’s] priorities should not focus federal resources in your 
States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous 
compliance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of 
marijuana.”51 To further guide U.S. Attorneys, the Ogden Memorandum 
explicitly identified characteristics that, if present, would indicate that 
the use of cannabis did not comply with state law.52 The Ogden 
Memorandum outlined seven characteristics.53 Most of the 
characteristics related to criminal activity, such as unlawful possession 
of firearms, violence, and ties to criminal enterprises.54 However, the 
Ogden Memorandum emphasized compliance with state laws.55 The 
federal government deferred to state law to impose limits on the amount 
of “cash” a person may gain or hold from medical cannabis sales.56 The 
Ogden Memorandum only outlined areas where the federal government 
would intervene if the states failed to adequately regulate the cannabis 
market,57 and the federal government did not prohibit the states from 
moving ahead with medical cannabis legalization.58 Because of this 
stance, many people thought that the Ogden Memorandum implicitly 
sanctioned the state’s authority to regulate cannabis use within its 
boundaries.59 As a result, the number of medical cannabis clinics 
                                                     
50. See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
51. Id. at 2.  
52. Id.  
53. Id.  
54. See id. 
55. See id. at 2–3.  
56. See id. at 2.  
57. See id. at 2–3.  
58. See id. 
59. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA 
L. REV. 74, 86–87 (2015); John Schroyer, The Famous Marijuana Memos: Q&A with Former DOJ 
Deputy Attorney General James Cole, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (July 27, 2016), 
https://mjbizdaily.com/the-famous-marijuana-memos-qa-with-former-doj-deputy-attorney-general-
james-cole/ [https://perma.cc/XQB4-M6BN] (quoting James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., “[y]ou 
have to go back to the Ogden Memo, which was the first one kind of in a series, and the sense that 
U.S. attorneys had, and came to me to try and remedy, which was that people were over-reading the 
Ogden Memo . . . it wasn’t intended to say that anyone who’s doing it in compliance with state law 
is just fine . . .”).  
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exploded.60 But the black-market cannabis industry also continued to 
thrive.61 The black market benefited from the increased awareness and 
limited availability of legal cannabis, and the demand for cannabis 
soared.62 The interaction between legal medical cannabis and illegal 
recreational cannabis markets forced the federal government to 
reconsider its stance on legalizing cannabis for anything more than 
medicinal use.63 Then the federal government began to crack down on 
California dispensaries and growers through raids, increased 
surveillance, and license revocation.64 
B. The Cole Memorandum Reiterated Enforcement Priorities Similar 
to the Ogden Memorandum’s 
Even as the federal government’s enforcement called into question 
the viability of legal medical cannabis, Washington and Colorado both 
forged ahead with the legalization of recreational cannabis in November 
2012.65 In response, on August 29, 2013, James M. Cole, Deputy 
Attorney General under the Obama Administration, issued guidance for 
states that legalized recreational cannabis, known as the Cole 
Memorandum.66 The Cole Memorandum provided additional guidance 
for “all federal enforcement” activities and officers, in determining how 
to respond to the legalization of recreational cannabis.67 The 
Memorandum reminded the states that legalized recreational cannabis 
that the CSA still banned cannabis.68 Like the Ogden Memorandum, the 
Cole Memorandum identified eight “enforcement priorities”69 that the 
                                                     
60. See Mandalit Del Barco, California Officials Target Big Marijuana Growers, NPR (Dec. 1, 
2009), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120983848 [https://perma.cc/YXF3-
GSQ3]. 
61. See id. 
62. See id.  
63. See Chemerinsky, supra note 59, at 86–88.  
64. See id.; Greg Winter, U.S. Cracks Down on Medical Marijuana in California, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 31, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/31/us/us-cracks-down-on-medical-marijuana-in-
california.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2018); Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE 
(Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216 
[https://perma.cc/75QU-FKGG]. 
65. See Martin, supra note 1; Ferner, supra note 6.  
66. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 1.  
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 4.  
69. The eight enforcement priorities included:  
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; Preventing revenue from the sale of 
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; Preventing the diversion of 
marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; Preventing 
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DOJ felt merited special attention.70 The Cole Memorandum attempted 
to interpret and clarify the guidance issued in the Ogden Memorandum.71 
Rather than focus federal government resources on prosecuting lower-
level violations, the Cole Memorandum urged federal enforcement 
agencies to concentrate on the enforcement priorities and leave other 
violations to local law enforcement agencies.72 Furthermore, it suggested 
that those federal enforcement agencies should be less willing to 
interfere with states that possess “strong and effective regulatory and 
enforcement systems.”73 Ultimately, the level of oversight by the federal 
government hinged on “whether the conduct at issue implicates one or 
more of the enforcement priorities.”74 
The federal government’s enforcement priorities between the Ogden 
Memorandum and Cole Memorandum shifted.75 While the emphasis 
remained on preventing criminal activity in conjunction with cannabis, 
federal concern increased regarding the diversion of legal Washington 
and Colorado cannabis to places beyond their respective borders.76 The 
Cole Memorandum required states to prevent diversion of recreational 
cannabis.77 If a state failed to do so, the federal government would 
intervene in state legalization by enforcing the CSA.78 To protect the 
                                                     
state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the 
cultivation and distribution of marijuana; Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of 
other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; Preventing the 
growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; and Preventing marijuana possession 
or use on federal property.  
Id. at 1–2. 
70. See id. 
71. See Schroyer, supra note 59 (“[Question:] Your first major memo sent a chill through the 
industry. How did that come about, and what was the intention behind it? . . . [Answer:] You have 
to go back to the Ogden Memo, which as the first one kind of in a series, and the sense that I think 
the U.S. Attorneys had, and came to me to try and remedy, which was that people were over-reading 
the Ogden Memo. . . it wasn’t intended to say that anyone who’s doing it in compliance with state 
law is just fine, and that’s where the misreading was coming in. So we wanted to try to clarify 
that.”). 
72. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
73. See id. at 2. 
74. See id. at 3.  
75. See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 16, at 2; Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2–3.  
76. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3. 
77. See id.   
78. See id. at 2 (“Instead, the Department has left such lower-level or localized activity to state 
and local authorities and has stepped in to enforce the CSA only when the use, possession, 
cultivation, or distribution of marijuana has threatened to cause one of the harms identified above 
[diversion].”).  
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recreational cannabis industry from federal intervention, each state had 
to fully comply with the Cole Memorandum.79 
Washington and Colorado each established comprehensive regulatory 
schemes to comply with the Cole Memorandum’s enforcement 
priorities.80 The Washington LCB tailored licensing structure to control 
and regulate the spread of cannabis.81 By creating a strict, limited 
regulatory scheme, the LCB seems to have been aiming to “[p]revent[] 
the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in 
some form to other states.”82 Colorado similarly created comprehensive 
regulation to control the flow of recreational cannabis.83 Instead of 
limiting licenses numerically, Colorado attempted to regulate every 
pathway through which a person might obtain cannabis.84 
C. The Sessions Memorandum Jeopardizes the Future of Cannabis 
and Elevates the Importance of Preventing Diversion 
On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the 
Cole and Ogden Memoranda through a new memorandum to U.S. 
Attorneys.85 Sessions simply stated, “[g]iven the Department’s well-
established principles, previous nationwide guidance specific to 
marijuana enforcement is unnecessary and is rescinded, effective 
immediately.”86 The press release accompanying the memorandum 
described it as a “return to the rule of law.”87 In a statement, Sessions 
also implied that the previous memoranda undermined that “rule of 
                                                     
79. See id. (“A system adequate to that task must not only contain robust controls and procedures 
on paper; it must also be effective in practice.”)  
80. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.342 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4 (2018).  
81. See Rule Making by the Liquor Control Board Regarding the Production, Processing, and 
Sale of Marijuana Pursuant to I-502: Hearing Before the H. Gov’t Accountability & Oversight 
Comm., 2013 Leg., 63d Sess., at 9:41 (Wash. 2013) (July 24, 2013, 11:00 am) [hereinafter Rule 
Making], www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2013071022&eventID=201307 
1022&autoStartStream=true (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (statement of Rick Garza, Director, Liquor 
Control Board).  
82. See Cole Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2.  
83. See 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.309 (LexisNexis 2018); Hudak & Wallach, supra note 35. 
84. See 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2.101; Hudak & Wallach, supra note 35. 
85. See Sessions Memorandum, supra note 43. 
86. Id.; see also Martin, supra note 1 (discussing the Ogden Memorandum, Cole Memorandum, 
and other guiding memoranda on cannabis). 
87. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Issues Memo 
on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-
memo-marijuana-enforcement [https://perma.cc/WLF2-C6NG].  
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law.”88 After Sessions issued the new guidance, it was uncertain whether 
the investigation and prosecution of the cannabis industry would actually 
increase.89 The Sessions Memorandum explicitly left the decision up to 
individual U.S. Attorneys.90 However, U.S. Attorneys follow certain 
guiding principles, which focus on the policy goals of the federal 
government.91 
Invested jurisdictions swiftly responded to the Sessions 
Memorandum. Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan stated that it would be 
“‘nearly impossible’ to ‘physically investigate and prosecute every legal 
shop’” and further vowed to “prohibit Seattle police officers from 
cooperating with authorities enforcing federal marijuana laws.”92 
Furthermore, Washington Governor Jay Inslee declared, 
In Washington state we have put in place a system in place [sic] 
that adheres to what we pledged to the people of Washington 
and the federal government; it’s well regulated, keeps criminal 
elements out, keeps pot out of the hands of kids and tracks it all 
carefully enough to clamp down on cross-border leakage. We 
are going to keep doing that and overseeing the well-regulated 
market that Washington voters approved.93 
 Colorado responded similarly. Colorado Governor John 
Hickenlooper stated, “The Cole Memo got it right . . . Colorado has 
                                                     
88. See Avery Anapol, DOJ: Rolling Back Obama-Era Marijuana Rules a ‘Return to the Rule of 
Law’, HILL (Jan. 4, 2018, 1:27 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/367439-sessions-
rolling-back-obama-era-guidance-that-allowed-legal-marijuana [https://perma.cc/Y2YS-ZUHN]; 
Josh Gerstein & Cristiano Lima, Sessions Announces End to Policy That Allowed Legal Pot to 
Flourish, POLITICO (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/04/jeff-
sessions-marijuana-policy-us-attorney-enforcement-324020 [https://perma.cc/846M-24VR] (“In a 
statement, the attorney general said the department's earlier guidance ‘undermines the rule of law’ 
by second-guessing the national drug laws Congress has passed.”). 
89. See, e.g., Hillary Bricken, Breaking News: Bye, Bye Cole Memo, Hello Uncertainty for 
Marijuana, CANNA L. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cannalawblog.com/breaking-news-bye-
bye-cole-memo-hello-uncertainty-for-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/G5M6-YM9K] (“The question 
now becomes what will future DOJ enforcement look like?”). 
90. See Sessions Memorandum, supra note 43, at 1 (“These principles require federal prosecutors 
deciding which cases to prosecute to weigh all the relevant considerations, including federal law 
enforcement priorities set by the Attorney General, the seriousness of the crime, the deterrent effect 
of criminal prosecution, and the cumulative impact of particular crimes on the community.”).  
91. See id. 
92. Lester Black, What Does Jeff Sessions’ War On Legal Weed Mean For Washington State?, 
STRANGER (Jan. 4, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.thestranger.com/slog/2018/01/04/25678999/what-
does-jeff-sessions-war-on-legal-weed-mean-for-washington-state [https://perma.cc/HC6M-DEM6] 
(quoting Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan).  
93. Statement from Inslee Regarding Reports That USDOJ Will Rescind Cole Memo, WASH. 
GOVERNOR: JAY INSLEE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/statement-inslee-
regarding-reports-usdoj-will-rescind-cole-memo [https://perma.cc/KK4A-935A].  
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created a comprehensive regulatory system committed to supporting the 
will of our voters.”94 Governor Hickenlooper promised that “[t]oday’s 
decision [rescinding the Cole Memorandum] does not alter the strength 
of our resolve in those areas, nor does it change my constitutional 
responsibilities.”95 Echoing Governor Hickenlooper, Denver Mayor 
Michael Hancock called the decision to rescind the Cole Memorandum 
“severely disappointing.”96 Colorado’s U.S. Senator, Cory Gardner, 
strongly criticized the decision because it “trampled on the will of the 
voters.”97 Both Governor Hickenlooper and Governor Inslee emphasized 
the efficacy of their states’ implemented regulatory systems and 
continued efforts to comply with the Cole Memorandum guidelines. 
 Both the U.S. Attorneys for Washington and Colorado indicated 
that, despite the rescission of the Cole Memorandum, their offices and 
policies would not change. Each U.S. Attorney noted that existing 
policies, procedures, and goals already comply with the guiding 
principles articulated in the Sessions Memorandum.98 U.S. Attorney for 
the District of Colorado Bob Troyer said that “his office will continue to 
focus on ‘identifying and prosecuting those who create the greatest 
safety threats to our communities around the state,’” goals which satisfy 
                                                     
94. Gov. Hickenlooper’s Statement on Trump Administration’s Decision to Rescind Policy 
Guiding Federal Approach to Marijuana Legalization, COLO. GOVERNOR JOHN HICKENLOOPER 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/news/gov-hickenlooper%E2%80%99s-
statement-trump-administration%E2%80%99s-decision-rescind-policy-guiding-federal 
[https://perma.cc/NN3E-X4YJ]. 
95. Id. 
96. See Thomas Mitchell, Mayoral Candidate Khalatbari Challenges Hancock’s Response to 
Sessions, WESTWORD (Jan. 5, 2018, 8:21 AM), http://www.westword.com/marijuana/denver-
mayor-hancock-challenger-respond-to-sessions-move-9855751 [https://perma.cc/U5S8-UX6M] 
(quoting Denver Mayor Michael Hancock).  
97. See Jesse Paul & John Murray, Cory Gardner Says AG Jeff Sessions’ Decision to Rescind 
Marijuana Policy “Has Trampled on the Will” of Colorado Voters, DENVER POST (Jan. 4, 2018, 
8:51 AM), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/01/04/cory-gardner-jeff-sessions-marijuana-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q4QD-ZBTA] (quoting Senator Cory Gardner).  
98. See Associated Press, U.S. Attorney for Colorado: No Changes on Marijuana Enforcement, 
FOX31 NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, at 11:51 AM), http://kdvr.com/2018/01/04/u-s-attorney-for-colorado-
status-quo-on-marijuana-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/KP5Y-AZVT]; Evan Bush & Mike Carter, 
‘An Attack on Seattle’: Washington State Officials Say They Won’t Back Down on Legal Pot as 
Sessions Rescinds Obama-Era Policy, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018, 9:31 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-state-officials-say-they-wont-back-down-on-
legal-pot-as-feds-plan-change/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018); Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office W. 
Dist. of Wash., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney Annette L. Hayes Statement on Federal 
Marijuana Prosecutions in the Western District of Washington (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/us-attorney-annette-l-hayes-statement-federal-marijuana-
prosecutions-western-district [https://perma.cc/5Q3E-6VG3].  
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the criteria of the Sessions Memorandum.99 Acting U.S. Attorney for the 
Western District of Washington Annette L. Hayes mirrored Troyer’s 
remarks but also added that her office would continue to “focus on those 
who pose the greatest safety risk to the people and communities we 
serve.”100 U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington Joseph 
H. Harrington issued a nearly identical statement recognizing the 
importance of public safety.101 
 While the U.S. Attorneys insist that enforcement surrounding 
cannabis will continue as before, the Sessions Memorandum 
foreshadows a new direction. The future of the cannabis industry and 
consequences for state laws are uncertain.102 Some predict that the U.S. 
Attorneys will continue enforcement as before, except there will “likely 
be a ripple effect from this news [of the Sessions Memorandum].”103 
Hilary Bricken, a noted cannabis legal scholar,104 wrote, “current access 
to banking, any tax reform progress, and investment are going to feel the 
chill of uncertainty and the threat of federal enforcement.”105 For 
example, banks remain wary of investing in cannabis businesses due to 
the businesses’ precarious legal position and potential liability.106  
 The focus of this Comment thus far has been on the enforcement of 
federal law by the executive branch of the federal government, such as 
the DOJ. The federal legislative and judicial branches have not yet acted 
in response to state legalization of recreational cannabis. Congress, 
                                                     
99. See U.S. Attorney for Colorado: No Changes on Marijuana Enforcement, supra note 98. 
100. See U.S. Attorney Annette L. Hayes Statement on Federal Marijuana Prosecutions in the 
Western District of Washington, supra note 98. 
101. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office E. Dist. Wash., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Marijuana 
Enforcement Policy (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edwa/pr/federal-marijuana-
enforcement-policy [https://perma.cc/GQY8-Q38Q] (“When weighing those considerations public 
safety is always at the fore.”).  
102. Bricken, supra note 89.  
103. Id. 
104. Hilary Bricken is an attorney at Harris Bricken, PLLC and the lead editor of the Canna Law 
Blog. Bricken was named one of the 100 most influential people in the cannabis industry in 2014 by 
Cannabis Business Executive. See Hilary Bricken, ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://abovethelaw.com/author/hbricken/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/QP8R-2SXU]; Rob Meagher, Kyle 
Meagher & Jeff Hare, The Most Influential People in the Cannabis Industry, The Cannabis Business 
Executive 100, CANNABIS BUS. EXEC (Nov. 12, 2014), 
https://www.cannabisbusinessexecutive.com/cbe100-2014/ [https://perma.cc/LN74-RWPN].  
105. Bricken, supra note 89.  
106. See Monica Mendoza, Colorado Lawmakers Fire Back at AG Sessions’ Move to Rescind 
Obama-Era Pot Rules, DENVER BUS. J. (Jan. 4, 2018, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2018/01/04/colorado-lawmakers-fire-back-at-ag-
sessions-move.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (quoting Don Childears, President and CEO of the 
Colorado Bank Association). 
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however, passed the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer amendment in 2014 to 
prevent the federal government from using funds to prosecute legalized 
medical cannabis use.107 After the Trump administration’s rescission of 
the Cole Memorandum, the amendment’s future became uncertain.108 
While the Rohrabacher-Blumenauer amendment is still in effect,109 its 
protection only extends to medical cannabis.110 No similar protection 
exists for recreational cannabis. Therefore, the future of legalized 
recreational cannabis remains unprotected by Congress. 
II. STATE OPPOSITION TO LEGALIZED CANNABIS CREATES 
INCENTIVES FOR THE JUDICIARY TO POLICE THE 
CANNABIS INDUSTRY 
On December 18, 2014, Nebraska and Oklahoma requested 
permission from the U.S. Supreme Court to sue Colorado,111 noting that 
the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between different 
states.112 
Nebraska and Oklahoma argued that “[Colorado’s] Amendment 64 
and its resultant statutes and regulations are devoid of safeguards to 
ensure marijuana cultivated and sold in Colorado is not trafficked to 
other states, including [Nebraska and Oklahoma].”113 Nebraska and 
Oklahoma feared the repercussions of legalizing cannabis in Colorado 
would have on their own states, calling cannabis diversion a “dangerous 
gap” in the federal drug system.114 The plaintiff states argued that the 
“gap” is actively “undermining [Nebraska and Oklahoma’s] own 
                                                     
107. See Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2015, H.R. 
4660, 113th Cong. § 558 (2014) (enacted) (as amended by H. Amdt. 25, 113th Cong. (2014), 160 
Cong. Rec. H5008 (daily ed. May 29, 2014)); NORML, Federal Spending Bill Includes Medical 
Marijuana Protections, DAILY CHRONIC (Mar. 23, 2018), 
http://www.thedailychronic.net/2018/90242/federal-spending-bill-includes-medical-marijuana-
protections/ [http://perma.cc/25XS-NRFR].  
108. See NORML, supra note 107. 
109. See S. Amdt. 3712, 115th Cong. (2018), 164 Cong. Rec. S5698 (Aug. 16, 2018) (amending 
H.R. 6157, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted)). This bill is up for renewal on December 7, 2018. Id. 
110. Id.; Hilary Bricken, No Congressional Couch Lock: State Medical Marijuana Laws 
Protected Through September 30th, ABOVE THE LAW, (Mar. 27, 2018) 
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/no-congressional-couch-lock-state-medical-marijuana-laws-
protected-through-september-30th/ [https://perma.cc/6UR8-F3TT]. 
111. Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 1, Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 
1034 (2016) (No. 144), 2014 WL 7474136. 
112. Complaint at 1, Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144), 2014 
WL 7474136. 
113. Id. at 3.  
114. Id. at 3.  
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marijuana bans, draining their treasuries, and placing stress on their 
criminal justice systems.”115 Nine former administrators of the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration between 1973 to 2007 filed a brief as 
Amici Curiae to support Nebraska and Oklahoma.116 
Nebraska and Oklahoma cited the Supremacy Clause117 and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause118 to support their argument that it is 
“unlawful to conspire to violate the [Controlled Substances Act].”119 
Nebraska and Oklahoma alleged: 
[T]he diversion of marijuana from Colorado contradicts the 
[CSA’s] clear Congressional intent, frustrates the federal interest 
in eliminating commercial transactions in the interstate 
controlled-substances market, and is particularly burdensome for 
neighboring states like [Nebraska and Oklahoma] where law 
enforcement agencies and the citizens have endured the 
substantial expansion of Colorado marijuana.120 
In supplemental briefing, Nebraska and Oklahoma attacked the Solicitor 
General’s view that “because Colorado law does not explicitly ‘direct[] 
or authorize[]’ the transport of Colorado marijuana across state lines, 
Colorado bears no responsibility for the fact that those harmful border 
crossings occur.”121 The plaintiff states compared Colorado’s cannabis 
industry to a “massive criminal enterprise,” which would protect its 
growers and distributors in violation of federal law.122 
Despite Nebraska and Oklahoma’s concerns,123 the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied the motion to file a bill of complaint.124 While the majority 
                                                     
115. See id. at 3–4.  
116. Brief for All Nine Former Administrators of Drug Enforcement as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff States’ Motion for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint, Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U.S. __, 
136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 144), 2015 WL 1262747.  
117. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”) 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
119. Complaint at 7, Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2014) (No. 144), 2014 
WL 747136. 
120. Id. at 6.  
121. See Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 3, On Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Nebraska v. 
Colorado, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (No. 220144), 2016 WL 74964 (citation omitted).  
122. See id. at 4.  
123. While Oklahoma legalized medical marijuana in June 2018 (the thirtieth state to do so), 
Oklahoma has not provided any indication that their position on recreational marijuana has changed. 
See Tom Angell, Oklahoma Voters Legalize Marijuana for Medical Use, FORBES (June 26, 2018, 
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decision did not explain its reasoning for denying the motion, Justice 
Thomas and Justice Alito dissented.125 The dissent’s main reason was 
jurisdictional: both Justices questioned whether the Court could decline 
to hear a case under its original and exclusive jurisdiction.126 
Nevertheless, the dissent recognized that the harms alleged by Nebraska 
and Oklahoma are “significant” and merit attention.127 
III. WASHINGTON’S REGULATORY SCHEME LIMITS 
CERTAIN INDUSTRY LICENSES OF CANNABIS TO 
BALANCE ELIMINATING THE ILLICIT MARKET AND 
SECURING BORDERS 
To comply with the veiled mandate of the Cole Memorandum and 
prevent a suit by neighboring states, the Washington Legislature 
instructed the state’s LCB to create a regulatory structure for the 
legalized cannabis industry.128 The LCB “mirrored” the pre-existing 
liquor regulatory scheme to cabin cannabis production and sales in an 
effort to comply with the enforcement priorities of the Cole 
Memorandum and prevent diversion.129 By limiting the number of 
parties able to legally sell cannabis, the LCB hoped to control legalized 
cannabis itself. This Part first discusses the Legislature’s statutory grant 
of authority to the LCB. Next, it examines the regulations that the LCB 
promulgated to accomplish the goals of the Cole Memorandum. Finally, 
it assesses whether those regulations have effectively prevented 
diversion to other states. 
A. The Washington Legislature Required the LCB to Create 
Regulations for the Cannabis Industry 
The Washington Legislature codified the Uniform Controlled 
Substances Act in 1971.130 The initial enactment of the Washington 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act penalized possession and use of 
                                                     
10:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2018/06/26/oklahoma-voters-legalize-
marijuana-for-medical-use/#7c29c84d1374 [https://perma.cc/QRL6-4BUU].  
124. See Nebraska, 136 S. Ct. at 1034.  
125. See id. 
126. See id. at 1034–35 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
127. See id. 
128. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.342 (2018).  
129. Rule Making, supra note 81, at 13:44 (statement of Rep. Christopher Hurst). 
130. 1971 Wash. Sess. 1794 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50 (2018)). 
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cannabis.131 After the passage of I-502, the Legislature amended the 
Washington Uniform Controlled Substances Act to include the laws 
related to cannabis legalization.132 
The Washington Legislature authorized the LCB to “adopt rules”133 as 
well as the “procedures and criteria”134 for designing the rules.135 The 
rules that LCB adopts must be “for the purpose of carrying into effect 
the provisions of [I-502].”136 I-502 directed the government to take 
“marijuana out of the hands of illegal drug organizations” and 
incorporate “it under a tightly regulated, state-licensed system similar to 
that for controlling hard alcohol.”137 In a presentation to the Washington 
House Government Accountability and Oversight Committee, LCB 
Director Rick Garza stated that the “Agency Objective” focused on 
creating rules and “[i]nclud[ed] strict controls to prevent diversion, 
illegal sales, and sales to minors.”138 
Pursuant to the Revised Code of Washington 69.50.345, the LCB 
must provide rules regarding producers, processors, and retailers of 
cannabis.139 These rules must address licensing,140 taking special care to 
consider: (a) “[s]ecurity and safety issues”; (b) the “provision of 
adequate access to licensed sources . . . to discourage purchases from the 
illegal market”; and (c) “economies of scale.”141 When determining how 
many licenses to award in each county, the LCB must consult with the 
Office of Financial Management. The LCB must consider multiple 
factors, such as safety issues and sufficiency of licensed sources to 
undercut the illicit market, as well as the “[p]opulation distribution” and 
the “number of retail outlets holding medical marijuana 
endorsements.”142 Based on these criteria, the LCB developed rules to 
regulate cannabis licenses. 
                                                     
131. 1971 Wash. Sess. 1802.  
132. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.301–69.50.395. 
133. Id. § 69.50.342. 
134. Id. § 69.50.345. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. § 69.50.342(1). 
137. Wash. Initiative Measure No. 502 (enacted 2012) (codified in WASH. REV. CODE. 
§§ 69.50.301–369 (2018)), https://www.sos.wa.gov//_assets/elections/initiatives/i502.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A34B-RHH3]. 
138. Rule Making, supra note 81, at 9:41 (statement of Rick Garza, Director, Liquor Control 
Board). 
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.345(1) (2018).  
140. See id. § 69.50.345(1)–(2). 
141. Id. § 69.50.345(6)(a)–(c). 
142. Id. § 69.50.345(2)(a)–(d). 
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B. LCB Promulgated Regulations that Created a Limited Licensing 
Scheme to Comply with Its Statutory Mandate 
The LCB drafted rules to comply with its legislative mandate. The 
rules covered cannabis licenses, the application process, requirements to 
receive licenses, and reporting.143 These licensing rules primarily 
encompass three categories: (1) “general information”144; 
(2) qualifications and the application processes145; and (3) types of 
violations.146 While creating the initial rules for the licensing scheme 
under Washington Administrative Code 314-55-015, the LCB submitted 
the proposed rules for publication in the Washington State Register.147 
The purpose of the rules read: “This is a new [cannabis] industry in the 
state of Washington. Rules are needed to clarify the new laws created by 
[I-502] so the public is aware of the qualifications and requirements for 
marijuana licenses in the state of Washington.”148 
The LCB initially restricted the number of applicants for each type of 
license—the producer,149 processor,150 and retail151 license. But the LCB 
limited the producer and processor licenses differently from retail 
licenses.152 Producer and processor license applications had to apply 
within a thirty-day period,153 while retail license applications were 
governed by “time frames published on [the LCB] web site.”154 
According to the LCB, the thirty-day application window was designed 
to allow all “qualified” applicants the opportunity to apply, and 
“[c]losing the window after 30 days [would] allow[] the Board the 
opportunity to assess the market and see what changes.”155 Moreover, 
producers and processors had no limit on the number of licenses.156 
                                                     
143. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55 (2018). 
144. Id. § 314-55-015. 
145. See id. §§ 314-55-020, 075, 077, 079.  
146. See id. §§ 314-55-520, 525, 530, 535. 
147. 13-14 Wash. Reg. 124 (July 3, 2013).  
148. Id.  
149. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-075(4). 
150. Id. § 314-55-077(12). 
151. Id. §§ 314-55-081(1)–(2). 
152. See WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 
I 502 PROPOSED RULES 1 (2013) [hereinafter FAQ], https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-
502/proposed_rules/i-502_Proposed_Rules_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9KW-8NPA].  
153. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 314-55-075(4), 077(12). 
154. Id. § 314-55-081(1). 
155. FAQ, supra note 152, at 1.  
156. See id.  
18 - Sweeney (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:52 PM 
2194 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:2175 
 
The LCB originally limited retail license applications to a thirty-day 
window, just like processor licenses and producer licenses.157 The LCB 
copied Colorado’s practice of using a thirty-day window.158 The agency 
felt that it would be best for processors and producers to understand how 
many retail locations would be available in order to gauge the market 
capacity.159 However, the LCB amended the rules on October 21, 2013, 
to provide the LCB with additional discretion to adjust the time-window, 
rather than firmly limiting retail applications to a thirty-day window as 
with producer and processor licenses.160 
The LCB also limited the number of available retail licenses. The 
LCB limited retail licenses by apportioning them according to 
“estimated consumption data and population data” in discrete amounts 
per county.161 The LCB recognized that “[m]unicipalities could 
conceivably zone marijuana [and] related businesses out of their 
geographical area.”162 Regardless, the LCB could not force cities to host 
cannabis retailers if the cities chose not to do so. The LCB sent allotted 
licenses to cities and local municipalities and then let each decide 
whether to issue business licenses according to the unique local zoning 
rules.163 A lottery system determined who received an application if the 
number of applications exceeded the allotted amounts in each 
municipality.164 However, the LCB allots retail licenses according to a 
“priority system,”165 that preferences applicants who have applied, 
operated, and maintained a cannabis license.166 Next, applicants who 
operated a “collective garden” receive priority,167 and then, the LCB 
considers other applicants.168 
                                                     
157. 13-14 Wash. Reg. 124 (July 3, 2013).  
158. Rule Making, supra note 81, at 12:29 (statement of Rick Garza, Director, Liquor Control 
Board).  
159. Id. at 1:09:14. 
160. 13-14 Wash. Reg. 91 (July 3, 2013) (codified as amended at WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-
081) (repealed 2018); see also 15-19 Wash. Reg. 59 (Sept. 23, 2015) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55).  
161. 13-14 Wash. Reg. 91. 
162. FAQ, supra note 152, at 2.  
163. See Rule Making, supra note 81, at 55:19 (statement of Rick Garza, Director, Liquor Control 
Board). 
164. See id. at 40:55. 
165. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-020(3).  
166. Id. § 3-14-55-020(3)(a).  
167. Id. § 3-14-55-020 (3)(b).  
168. Id. § 3-14-55-020 (3)(c).  
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After creating the rules, the LCB began the complicated process of 
calculating the appropriate number of retail licenses per municipality. 
On March 19, 2013, the LCB hired BOTEC Analysis Corporation as a 
“marijuana consultant” for Washington’s implementation of I-502.169 
Specifically, BOTEC analyzed the cannabis “Retail Store Allocation” 
between Washington localities.170 BOTEC provided “five 
‘mathematical’ methods” to distribute the retail stores throughout 
Washington, based on population and distance.171 
However, the BOTEC analysis began with two assumptions about the 
initial cannabis market. First, BOTEC assumed that the legal cannabis 
market would grow “to serve roughly one-quarter of marijuana 
consumption in Washington.”172 However, the study recognized that one 
of the “biggest” uncertainties was “how much market share I-502 stores 
can take away from the medical access points and the purely illegal 
black market.”173 BOTEC assumed that cannabis consumption would 
mirror the consumption of liquor.174 So, they decided that the number of 
total cannabis retailers in Washington should be “close to the number of 
LCB liquor stores in service during their last full year of operation.”175 
Accordingly, BOTEC advised the LCB to distribute approximately 330 
stores throughout all counties.176 
The BOTEC analysis and LCB expectations differed from reality. 
Legal cannabis from new stores composed 35% of the market, rather 
than 25%,177 and the revenues were significantly higher.178 As a result, 
                                                     
169. Press Release, Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis Bd., Liquor Control Board Announces 
BOTEC Analysis Corporation as Marijuana Consultant (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/liquor-control-board-announces-botec-analyses-corporation-
marijuana-consultant [https://perma.cc/L57R-5LEX].  
170. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS & LINDEN DAHLKEMPER, BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP., RETAIL STORE 
ALLOCATION (2013), https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/BOTEC%20reports/ 
Re_Store_Allocation_Task_Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/89PB-2RUW].  
171. See id. at 3.  
172. Id. at 4; see also BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND DRUG POLICY RESEARCH CTR., BEFORE THE 
GRAND OPENING: MEASURING WASHINGTON STATE’S MARIJUANA MARKET IN THE LAST YEAR 
BEFORE LEGALIZED COMMERCIAL SALES (2013), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR466/RAND_RR466.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VV6Y-W7K7]. 
173. CAULKINS & DAHLKEMPER, supra note 170, at 3.  
174. Id.  
175. Id. at 4. 
176. Id. at 5.  
177. MARK A.R. KLEIMAN ET AL., BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP., ESTIMATING THE SIZE OF THE 
MEDICAL CANNABIS MARKET IN WASHINGTON STATE (2015), 
https://lcb.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/BOTEC%20reports/BOTEC-MMJ-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HF4P-DE2E].  
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cannabis consumption and demand exceeded expectations for 2012–
2013.179 
Even though the demand for legal cannabis exceeded expectations, 
several local jurisdictions in Washington denied the retail licenses180 
allocated by the LCB.181 In July 2014, the LCB authorized 
approximately 330 licenses,182 and held a lottery to choose from 2,200 
applications.183 Currently, there are 519 retail licenses and 1,188 
producer and processor licenses.184 The ratio is significantly skewed. 
“Washington handed out grower licenses more quickly than retail 
licenses, creating an imbalance between farms and stores.”185 In sum, the 
supply is outstripping the demand.186 
C. Limited Licensing Has Not Alleviated Concerns of Diversion from 
Washington State 
Despite Washington’s tightly regulated system, the DOJ remains 
watchful and concerned about the state’s legalized cannabis industry.187 
                                                     
178. Report: WA Cannabis Consumption Double Initial Predictions, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY 
(Dec. 18, 2013), https://mjbizdaily.com/report-wa-cannabis-consumption-double-initial-predictions/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8LR-D922]. 
179. See id.  
180. Marijuana Regulation in Washington State, MRSC (July 17, 2018), 
http://mrsc.org/getdoc/8cd49386-c1bb-46f9-a3c8-2f462dcb576b/Marijuana-Regulation-in-
Washington-State.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also infra Appendix E. 
181. See WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.331(9) (2018) (“A city, town, or county may adopt an 
ordinance prohibiting a marijuana producer or marijuana processor from operating or locating a 
business within areas zoned primarily for residential use or rural use with a minimum lot size of five 
acres or smaller.”).  
182. Kirk Johnson, Sales of Recreational Marijuana Begin in Washington, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/washington-to-begin-sales-of-recreational-
marijuana.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2018). 
183. Associated Press, Washington State Issues First Legal-Marijuana Business License, N.Y. 
POST (Mar. 6, 2014, 5:21 AM), https://nypost.com/2014/03/06/washington-state-issues-first-legal-
marijuana-business-license/ [https://perma.cc/9N2G-U8SX]. 
184. Marijuana Dashboard: Licensing, WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD (2018), 
https://data.lcb.wa.gov/stories/s/WSLCB-Marijuana-Dashboard/hbnp-ia6v/ [https://perma.cc/5FUK-
M3QQ]. 
185. Jane Wells, Washington Has More Pot than It Can Smoke, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2015, 10:53 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/11/legal-marijuana-sales-so-much-pot-in-washington-
growers-giving-it-away.html [https://perma.cc/Z8UY-2BHW]. 
186. Id.; see also Chart of the Week: Recreational Cannabis Surplus in WA Squeezing Growers, 
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Jan. 4, 2016), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-week-recreational-cannabis-
surplus-wa-squeezing-growers/ [https://perma.cc/B3K5-D3J7]; see infra Appendix A. 
187. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Jay Inslee, 
Governor, State of Wash., and Bob Ferguson, Att’y Gen., State of Wash. (July 24, 2017) 
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Before issuing the Sessions Memorandum, Attorney General Sessions 
directed comments to Washington to highlight that the Cole 
Memorandum does not prevent “investigation or prosecution” even if 
none of the enforcement priorities are violated.188 The letter advised 
Washington to tighten its regulations controlling Washington 
cannabis.189 The Washington State Marijuana Impact Report, a study by 
the Northwest High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area,190 found that 
Washington cannabis had spread to forty-three different states.191 
Concerned, Attorney General Sessions insinuated that regulations in 
Washington did not sufficiently regulate cannabis.192 
The Report also recognized that the total pounds per year of 
Washington cannabis seized outside of the state had declined, and was at 
a lower level than it had been pre-legalization.193 While Washington’s 
sales along the Oregon border dropped 41% when Oregon legalized 
cannabis, only “11.9 percent was potentially being diverted out of 
Washington overall, and it dropped to 7.5 percent after Oregon’s 
legalization.”194 Increasing legalization decreases diversion.195 
Additionally, University of Oregon economist Keaton Miller stated that 
when conducting randomized searches along the Idaho border of 
Washington, one “might expect to find illegally transported marijuana at 
most 4 percent of the time.”196 While Washington’s strict licensing 
                                                     
[hereinafter Letter from Jeff Sessions], https://s3.amazonaws.com/big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/ 
LtrfromSessions.pdf [https://perma.cc/J27U-H78H].  
188. Id. at 1.  
189. Id. at 2.  
190. DAVE RODRIGUEZ, NW. HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, WASHINGTON STATE 
MARIJUANA IMPACT REPORT 92–98 (2016) [hereinafter NWHIDTA REPORT], 
http://www.riag.ri.gov/documents/NWHIDTAMarijuanaImpactReportVolume1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/28WK-TG74].  
191. Id.  
192. See Letter from Jeff Sessions, supra note 187, at 2.  
193. NWHIDTA REPORT, supra note 190, at 95; see infra Appendix B. Cannabis diversion 
peaked in 2012 and has been declining ever since. Id. 
194. Oregon’s Marijuana Legalization Prompted Big Drop in Sales in Washington’s Border 
Counties, EUREKALERT! (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2017-09/uoo-
oml090517.php [https://perma.cc/9RRR-NBXY] (citing Benjamin Hansen, Miner Professor of 
Economics at the University of Oregon); Benjamin Hansen, Keaton Miller & Caroline Weber, The 
Grass Is Greener on the Other Side: How Extensive Is the Interstate Trafficking of Recreational 
Marijuana? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23762, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23762.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P8L-FPRV].  
195. See Oregon’s Marijuana Legalization Prompted Big Drop in Sales in Washington’s Border 
Counties, supra note 194.  
196. Id.  
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scheme does not eradicate all diversion, there is evidence that only a 
small amount of cannabis escaped outside of state borders. 
IV. COLORADO’S LICENSING SYSTEM DOES NOT LIMIT 
LICENSES AND ALLOWS ALMOST ALL QUALIFIED 
APPLICANTS TO OPERATE RETAIL STORES 
On November 6, 2012, Colorado voters legalized recreational 
cannabis through a constitutional amendment passed as a ballot 
initiative.197 Amendment 64 created a “fully regulated system of 
cultivation and sales, which will eliminate the underground marijuana 
market and generate tens of millions of dollars per year in new revenue 
and criminal justice savings.”198 According to House Bill 1284, 
Colorado had a pre-existing “framework for medical marijuana centers 
(dispensaries), cultivation facilities, and manufacturers of edible 
marijuana products.”199 Colorado’s enforcement agency for both medical 
and recreational cannabis, the Department of Revenue’s Marijuana 
Enforcement Division (MED),200 has the authority to “develop industry 
regulations. . . .”201 
First, this Part addresses how the Colorado medical cannabis 
regulation system incorporated the recreational system. Second, this Part 
examines the effectiveness of Colorado’s recreational cannabis 
regulations. 
A. Colorado Amended Its Constitution to Secure the Right to Legal 
Cannabis Use 
Amendment 64 created a new section of the Colorado Constitution, 
appending section 16 to Article XVIII.202 The section opened by 
articulating the purpose of the Amendment: 
In the interest of the efficient use of law enforcement resources, 
enhancing revenue for public purposes, and individual freedom, 
the people of the state of Colorado find and declare that the use 
                                                     
197. See Ferner, supra note 6 (quoting Mason Tvert, co-director of the Campaign to Regulate 
Marijuana like Alcohol). 
198. Id.  
199. MILES K. LIGHT ET AL., THE MARIJUANA POLICY GRP., MARKET SIZE AND DEMAND FOR 
MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 5 (2014).  
200. See Hudak & Wallach, supra note 35. 
201. See MED Rulemaking, COLO. DEP’T REVENUE, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/MEDrulemaking [https://perma.cc/J6HL-Y5W3].  
202. COLO. CONST. amend. 64 (2012).  
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of marijuana should be legal for persons twenty-one years of age 
or older and taxed in a similar manner to alcohol.203 
Article XVIII, section 16 also established additional rationales,204 
definitions,205 permissible personal uses of cannabis,206 permissible retail 
activities relating to cannabis,207 regulatory structures,208 social areas 
which remain unaffected,209 medical cannabis provisions which remain 
unaffected,210 manner of enactment,211 and effective date.212 
The new amendment created requirements for establishing the 
regulatory structure.213 The section first required that the Department of 
Revenue214 develop regulations for the implementation of cannabis by 
July 1, 2013.215 The regulations had to establish procedures for 
“issuance, renewal, suspension, and revocation”216 of cannabis licenses 
and requirements to prevent diversion of cannabis.217 Additionally, the 
section created a preference for applicants who had previously 
distributed or produced cannabis according to regulations governing 
medical cannabis, and had consistently complied with those 
requirements.218 
Amendment 64 also required local jurisdictions to act before the 
MED issued licenses to applicants219 by identifying the local entity that 
will process applications by October 1, 2013.220 The Constitution did not 
permit the local jurisdictions’ rules to conflict with the state 
regulations.221 However, the Colorado Constitution empowered each 
                                                     
203. Id. at art. XVIII, § 16(1)(a).  
204. Id. § 16(1)(a)–(d). 
205. Id. § 16(2).  
206. Id. § 16(3).  
207. Id. § 16(4).  
208. Id. § 16(5). 
209. Id. § 16(6). 
210. Id. § 16(7). 
211. Id. § 16(8). 
212. Id. § 16(9). 
213. Id. § 16(5)(a)(I). 
214. Id. § 16(2)(c). 
215. Id. § 16(5)(a). 
216. Id. § 16(5)(a)(I). 
217. Id. § 16(5)(a)(V). 
218. Id. § 16(5)(b). 
219. Id. § 16(5)(a)(I). 
220. Id. § 16(5)(e). 
221. Id.  
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jurisdiction to adopt its own procedures and rules, even to the extent that 
the jurisdiction could substantially limit the availability of licenses 
within their jurisdiction or prohibit cannabis operations entirely.222 If 
local jurisdictions chose not to allow cannabis licenses, the decision to 
prohibit was placed on the general election ballot.223 This method of 
deciding whether local jurisdictions may prohibit licenses is different 
from Washington because it places more power in the hands of the 
people. 
The Constitution also required the Department of Revenue to “[b]egin 
accepting and processing applications on October 1, 2013,”224 as well as 
“[i]ssue an annual license to the applicant . . . unless the department 
finds the applicant is not in compliance with regulations.”225 The 
Department did not have the discretion to deny or approve an applicant 
unless the applicant failed to meet the necessary qualification.226 The 
Department of Revenue may also refuse to accept an application if the 
local jurisdiction informs the Department that an applicant is not in 
compliance with its own regulations or the local jurisdiction exceeded its 
own numerical limit on licenses.227 The Department of Revenue may 
accept all compliant license applications unless a jurisdiction 
affirmatively limits its available applications before the license is 
accepted. This structure differs from Washington because the Colorado 
structure does not place limits on licenses. 
B. The MED Designed Colorado’s Recreational Licensing Structure 
to Incorporate the Pre-Existing Medical Dispensary Structure 
Before Colorado passed Amendment 64, in November 2000, 
Colorado voters passed Amendment 20,228 amending its Constitution to 
include article XVIII, section 14, which legalized the use of medical 
cannabis.229 Article XVIII, section 14 required the General Assembly to 
                                                     
222. Id.  
223. Id.  
224. Id. § 16(5)(g)(I). 
225. Id. § 16(5)(g)(III). 
226. See id.  
227. See id.  
228. Amendment 20 to Colorado’s State Constitution, AMS. FOR SAFE ACCESS, 
https://www.safeaccessnow.org/amendment_20_to_colorado_s_state_constitutionnew 
[https://perma.cc/725A-HKYV]. 
229. Id. § 14.  
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“define such terms and enact such legislation as may be necessary for 
implementation of this section.”230 
The Colorado General Assembly initially codified authorization for 
medical cannabis under the “Power and Duties of the Department of 
Public Health and Environment.”231 However, in 2010—after the Ogden 
Memorandum—the General Assembly enacted an entirely new statutory 
scheme that authorized structures for medical cannabis in the Colorado 
Revised Statutes (C.R.S.).232 MED received a mandate to “promulgate 
such rules and such special rulings and findings as necessary for the 
proper regulation and control of the cultivation, manufacture, 
distribution, and sale of medical marijuana and for the enforcement of 
this article.”233 
MED responded by creating “Rules Regarding the Sales, 
Manufacturing and Dispensing of Medical Marijuana.”234 The Rules 
promote a “vertically integrated closed-loop commercial medical 
marijuana regulatory scheme by . . . [creating] requirements aimed at 
ensuring public safety, facilitating full operational transparency, and 
eliminating illicit diversion of marijuana.”235 The emphasis in the 
regulations remains on preventing cannabis from leaking outside of the 
normal, sanctioned purchases at medical cannabis facilities.236 The 2010 
statutory scheme provided stricter requirements for the licensing of 
medical cannabis businesses, based on the Colorado liquor-licensing 
code.237 The liquor-licensing code and medical cannabis code require 
that any person applying for a medical cannabis license first procure a 
license from the local municipality before applying for a state-issued 
license.238 This requirement differs from Washington in that there is no 
state grant of a license unless the local jurisdiction has already approved 
the license. Applicants who expect to use the license granted by the state 
authority must first be granted a license by the local authority.239 
                                                     
230. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14(8).  
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1.5-106 (2003). 
232. Id. § 12-43.3 (2010).  
233. Id. § 12-43.3-202(b)(I). 
234. COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1 (2018). 
235. Id. § 212-1 (2011) 
236. See id.  
237. See Michael Dohr, Medical Marijuana in Colorado, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislative-staff/research-editorial-legal-and-committee-
staff/medical-marijuana-in-colorado.aspx [https://perma.cc/HH32-C9JQ].  
238. See id.; 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws. 1648 (codified as amended COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3 
(2018)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.3-305(2). 
239. See Dohr, supra note 237.  
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Through the C.R.S., the General Assembly permits the regulation of 
the recreational cannabis industry.240 The “Colorado Retail Marijuana 
Code” appears under the Health portion of the Professions and 
Occupations section.241 The Colorado General Assembly established 
four types of cannabis licenses: retail stores, retail cultivation facilities, 
retail products manufacturers, and retail testing facilities.242 A person 
may operate “dual operation[s]” if the local jurisdiction permits.243 This 
structure is similar to the vertical-integration established in the state’s 
medical cannabis regulatory scheme.244 Furthermore, Colorado allows 
“home grow operations” but these programs are closely regulated by 
capping “the number of plants that can be possessed or grown on a 
residential property.”245 
Unlike Washington, Colorado does not further limit licenses either 
through a time window or allocation by population throughout the 
state.246 Instead, the regulations rely on the application procedures,247 
schedule of fees,248 qualifications,249 and continued compliance with 
licensing regulations250 to filter out unsatisfactory applicants. The 
regulations further elaborate on the “existing, vertically integrated 
medical market.”251 Washington expressly prohibits vertical 
integration,252 but Colorado only mandated vertical integration until 
October 2014, when regulations changed to allow for separation between 
the different stages of cannabis production.253 
                                                     
240. See id.  
241. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.4. 
242. Id. § 12-43.4-401(1)(a)–(d). 
243. Id. § 12-43.4-401(2)(a). 
244. See Dohr, supra note 237.  
245. H.B. 17–1220, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
246. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 (2018).  
247. Id. §§ 212-2.201–2.204. 
248. Id. §§ 212-2.207–2.210. 
249. Id. § 212-2.231.  
250. Id. §§ 212-2.250–2.252.  
251. Id. § 212-2.304; see also Walsh, supra note 28. 
252. See Walsh, supra note 28. 
253. Id.  
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C. Colorado Continues to Struggle with Diversion 
As of January 15, 2018, Colorado had issued 509 retail store licenses, 
as well as 999 cultivator and manufacturer licenses.254 While the gap 
between producers or processor licenses and retail store licenses is 
smaller in Colorado than in Washington, cannabis is still diverted 
outside of Colorado’s borders.255 Washington, Colorado, and the federal 
government remain concerned about the consequences of diversion.256 
According to the spokesperson for Oklahoma’s Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs, Colorado cannabis has “a reputation in Oklahoma 
because of how strong it is.”257 Authorities seized Colorado cannabis in 
thirty-six different states in 2015 and approximately 3,500 pounds of 
cannabis between 2009–2015, an increase from pre-legalization 
statistics.258 Therefore, Nebraska and Oklahoma’s concern that cannabis 
would flow into their states and force them to use their resources to 
combat the illegal cannabis is justified. 
V. NEITHER WASHINGTON NOR COLORADO IMPLEMENTED 
REGULATORY SCHEMES THAT EFFECTIVELY 
ELIMINATE ALL DIVERSION: A NEW STANDARD SHOULD 
BE DEVELOPED 
Almost six years ago, Washington and Colorado legalized cannabis. 
As studies reveal holes in the regulatory systems, the structure of the 
cannabis industry keeps changing. Diversion continues to be a problem 
for both states and a significant concern for the status of legal cannabis. 
The current presidential administration’s position on cannabis furthers 
the uncertainty, and the Sessions Memorandum further jeopardizes the 
viability of the cannabis industry. While the Cole Memorandum 
                                                     
254. Thomas Mitchell, Colorado Cannabis Dispensary Counter: Growth From 2014 to 2018, 
WESTWORD (Jan. 15, 2018, 8:12 AM), https://www.westword.com/marijuana/colorado-
dispensaries-how-many-are-there-9885310 [https://perma.cc/U5S8-UX6M]. 
255. See KEVIN WONG ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN HIGH INTENSITY DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA, 
THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO 111, 112 (2016) [hereinafter THE LEGALIZATION 
OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO], 
https://www.rmhidta.org/html/2016%20FINAL%20Legalization%20of%20Marijuana%20in%20Co
lorado%20The%20Impact.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WF7-57V2]; see infra Appendices C, D.  
256. See generally, Letter from Jeff Sessions, supra note 187.  
257. Eric Gorski & John Ingold, More Colorado Pot Is Flowing to Neighboring States, Officials 
Say, DENVER POST (Sept. 3, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/09/03/more-
colorado-pot-is-flowing-to-neighboring-states-officials-say/ [https://perma.cc/5PAD-2SMR]. 
258. THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 255, at 111–12; see infra 
Appendices C, D.  
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cautioned states in regulating the cannabis industry, the Sessions 
Memorandum created a void. DOJ rescinded the only guidance 
available, without replacing it or providing an indication of what steps 
the federal government might take with respect to cannabis investigation 
and prosecution. Left with no guidance from the federal government, the 
active disapproval from other states becomes more problematic. 
Congress’s refusal to resolve the tension between states and the 
federal government has shifted the pressure to the judiciary to fashion a 
resolution. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court might reconsider 
allowing a state-versus-state challenge, as seen in Nebraska v. 
Colorado.259 While federal courts have jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute, Congress is better able to consider all the consequences. Rather 
than allowing the executive branch to continue issuing and rescinding 
temporary guidance, or requiring the judicial branch to create 
widespread law after considering the narrow complaints of a few states, 
the legislative branch should create uniformity for the entire nation. 
Both Washington and Colorado continue to make reforms to prevent 
diversion.260 For example, Colorado more closely regulated its home-
grown program by capping “the number of plants that can be possessed 
or grown on a residential property.”261 Similarly, Washington 
incorporated the medical industry into its recreational licensing scheme 
and permitted cannabis retail stores to obtain medical cannabis 
endorsements.262 However, the producers and processors still outnumber 
the retailers, and prices have dropped as the supply outstrips the 
demand.263 The imbalance between supply and demand does not help 
eliminate the illegal market or stop “excess” cannabis from leaving the 
state.264 Despite Washington and Colorado’s hopes to account for all 
cannabis produced and sold in their respective states, questions linger 
                                                     
259. 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016). 
260. See Alice Wallace, Colorado Budget Proposal Calls for New Task Force to Target Illegal 
Marijuana Ops, CANNABIST (Nov. 1, 2017, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.thecannabist.co/2017/11/01/colorado-budget-task-force-illegal-marijuana-operations/ 
91494/ [https://perma.cc/6GY5-R9QN]. 
261. See H.B. 17–1220, 71st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2017). 
262. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.345(2)(d) (2018).  
263. Bart Schaneman, Washington State Cannabis Oversupply Spurs Calls for Legal Change, 
MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (Jan. 10, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/washington-state-cannabis-supply-
hits-new-low-spurs-calls-change/ [https://perma.cc/6Z8R-GVJD].  
264. Martin Kaste, Despite Legalization, Marijuana Black Market Hides in Plain Sight, NPR 
(May 16, 2018, 6:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/16/610579599/despite-legalization-
marijuana-black-market-hides-in-plain-sight (last visited Oct. 28, 2018). 
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about whether the regulatory systems will ever effectively prevent 
diversion, as defined by the federal government. 
As demonstrated by Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s letter to 
Washington Governor Jay Inslee, states that have legalized cannabis 
must assume that any diversion of cannabis to outside states may result 
in federal intrusion.265 The emphasis on complete and total elimination 
of diversion poses a significant problem for states with legalization 
schemes. The official data available, such as the Washington State 
Marijuana Impact Report, only focuses on whether cannabis is escaping 
from each state.266 The studies do not consider the diversion in the 
context of other black-market products (human organs, cocaine)267 or in 
comparison to the illegal cannabis industries in states that have not 
legalized cannabis (like Idaho).268 The focus of the studies thus far is not 
on the mechanisms by which cannabis escapes or the sources of the 
diverted Washington cannabis. The binary focus on whether diversion 
exists should shift to a more nuanced assessment. Completely 
eliminating diversion is likely not feasible—imposing the unrealistic 
standard cripples the industry without providing guidance for future 
change. 
The Cole Memorandum proposed an unrealistic standard for assessing 
regulation and preventing diversion. The government should use 
comprehensive assessments, which consider the context and success of 
regulation to date before threatening state legalization schemes. 
To effectively address the issue of diversion, more studies and 
information should be conducted to determine the size of both the legal 
and illegal cannabis markets, and the traffic patterns of diverted 
cannabis. Congress should then consider this information and act. 
Without more information on these subjects, changing cannabis 
licensing schemes and regulations will not adequately solve the issue of 
diversion or alleviate the federal government’s concerns. 
                                                     
265. See Letter from Jeff Sessions, supra note 187. 
266. See NWHIDTA REPORT, supra note 190; THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN 
COLORADO, supra note 255.  
267. Joshua B., America’s 8 Biggest Black Market Industries, RICHEST (March 22, 2014), 
https://www.therichest.com/rich-list/the-biggest/8-of-americas-biggest-black-market-industries/ 
[https://perma.cc/FTG2-RKKQ]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Washington and Colorado paved the path to legalization of 
recreational cannabis. The tension between the Controlled Substances 
Act and state legalization created additional pressure for both states to 
develop robust statutory and regulatory schemes to prevent cannabis 
from leaking into other states. The consequences of failing to completely 
eliminate diversion carries the threat of criminal enforcement by the 
DOJ or suit by other states in the U.S. Supreme Court, which could 
ultimately invalidate the legal status of cannabis in Washington and 
Colorado. 
While Washington and Colorado each attempted to create strict 
regulations to control cannabis, neither has completely eliminated 
diversion. Because total elimination of diversion is an unrealistic 
expectation, the federal government—executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches—should consider more than simply whether diversion exists. 
Instead, the federal government should analyze the effectiveness of 
regulations in a multi-factored context to understand whether legalized 
recreational cannabis actually creates a more significant burden on state 
resources than it did prior to legalization. 
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APPENDIX A: WASHINGTON STATE’S RECREATIONAL 
CANNABIS PRODUCTION SURPLUS269 
 
 
  
                                                     
269. Chart of the Week: Recreational Cannabis Surplus in WA Squeezing Growers, supra note 
186. 
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APPENDIX B: POUNDS OF WASHINGTON STATE MARIJUANA 
SEIZED OUT OF STATE 2010-2015270 
 
 
  
                                                     
270. NWHIDTA REPORT, supra note 190, at 95.  
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APPENDIX C: AVERAGE POUNDS OF COLORADO MARIJUANA 
FROM INTERDICTION SEIZURES271 
 
 
  
                                                     
271. THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 255, at 111. 
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APPENDIX D: STATES TO WHICH COLORADO MARIJUANA 
WAS DESTINED (2015)272 
 
 
  
                                                     
272. THE LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA IN COLORADO, supra note 255, at 111–12. 
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APPENDIX E: WASHINGTON MAP OF ZONING ORDINANCES 
FOR STATE-LICENSED MARIJUANA BUSINESSES273 
 
 
                                                     
273. Marijuana Regulation in Washington State, supra note 180. 
